AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS by Chemla, Gilles et al.
  
 
 
 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS 
 
Gilles Chemla  
Michel Habib 
Alexander Ljungqvist 
 
S-CG-01-04 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series     CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Research Group 
An Analysis of Shareholder Agreements1
Gilles Chemla, Michel Habib, and Alexander Ljungqvist2
UBC and CEPR, LBS, and NYU and CEPR
January 7, 2002
1We would like to thank Ekkehart Boehmer, Paolo Fulghieri, Sumantra Goshal, Dick Hackbarth, Chris
Hennessy, Josh Lerner, Gilad Livne, Pim Piers, Emily Sims, Diego Rodriguez, Kristian Rydqvist, Dorothea
Sha¨fer, John Stopford, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Andy Winton and seminar participants at the University
of British Columbia, UC Berkeley, Columbia Law School, University of Washington at Seattle, DFG Vienna,
the AAA-SG Meetings at Humboldt University, and the CEPR European Summer Symposium on Financial
Markets in Gerzensee for helpful discussions. All errors are our own.
2Chemla: Faculty of Commerce, University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC V6T 1Z2, Canada. Tel:
(604) 822 8490. Fax: (604) 822 4695. E-mail: gilles.chemla@commerce.ubc.ca. Habib: London Business
School, Sussex Place, Regent’s Park, London NW1 4SA. Tel: (020) 7262 5050. Fax: (020) 7724 3317. E-
mail: mhabib@london.edu. Ljungqvist: New York University, Stern School of Business, 44 West 4th Street,
#9-190, New York NY 10012. Tel: (212) 998 0304. Fax: (212) 995 4233. E-mail: aljungqv@stern.nyu.edu.
Chemla gratefully acknowledges financial support from SSHRC and the Bureau of Asset Management. Part
of this paper was written while Habib visited HEC Lausanne and ESA Beyrouth. The hospitality of these
two institutions is gratefully acknowledged.
Abstract
Shareholder agreements govern the relations among shareholders in privately-held companies, such
as joint ventures or venture capital-backed firms. We provide an economic explanation for the use
of put and call options, pre-emption rights, catch-up clauses, drag-along rights, demand rights, and
tag-along rights in shareholder agreements. We view these clauses as a response to a problem of
dynamic, double moral hazard, whereby the value of the venture depends on ex ante investments
and ex post transfers. Contract clauses i) preserve the incentives to make ex ante investments and
ii) minimize ex post transfers. We extend our framework to discuss the use of other clauses, such
as the option to extend the life of a business alliance. (JEL: G34).
Keywords: Shareholder Agreements; Put Options; Call Options; Pre-emption Rights; Catch-up
Clauses; Drag-along Rights; Demand Rights; Tag-along Rights.
1 Introduction
Shareholder agreements specify the rights and duties of shareholders when those prescribed by law
and regulation are thought not to be appropriate. Shareholder agreements mostly govern private
companies. Prominent examples are joint venture contracts and agreements between venture capi-
talists and entrepreneurs. In addition to specifying the shareholders’ rights and duties, shareholder
agreements mandate a dispute resolution process, allocate various types of options, and impose
restrictions on the transfer of shares.1
Shareholder agreements generally grant the parties the following rights: the option to put their
stakes to their partners or to call their partners’ stakes, in part or in whole, at a strike price that
is typically equal to ‘fair’ value; pre-emption rights that confer precedence to the parties in buying
their partners’ stakes at ‘fair’ value in case the partners should wish to exit the venture; catch-up
clauses that maintain the parties’ claims to part of the payoff from a trade sale or an IPO when
the parties have ceded their stakes to their partners following the partners’ exercise of a call option;
drag-along rights that allow the parties to force their partners to join them in selling their stakes to
a trade buyer in the case of a trade sale; demand rights that allow the parties to force their partners
to agree to taking the venture public in an IPO; and tag-along rights (or piggy-back rights, or co-sale
agreements) that allow the parties to demand of a trade buyer buying their partners’ stakes the
same treatment as received by their partners.2
We view the preceding clauses as serving to i) preserve the incentives to make ex ante investments
when ex post renegotiation is possible and ii) minimize ex post transfers in a setting of dynamic,
double moral hazard. Ex post renegotiation is to be avoided because it distorts ex ante investment
incentives. Opportunities for renegotiation arise when it is desirable to minimize value-reducing
1See Appendix 1. Standard shareholder agreements are described in Bernstein (1988), Freedman (1994), Martel
(1991), and Stedman and Jones (1990). Joint venture and venture capital contracts are special cases of shareholder
agreements. The former are described in Herzfeld and Wilson (1996), Linklaters et al. (1990), and Scott (1999).
The latter are described in Bartlett (1994) and Stedman and Jones (1990). Contracts appear to be strikingly similar
across countries and legal systems (Martel, 1991).
2Note that drag-along rights may conflict with pre-emption rights: the parties that can pre-empt their partners
cannot be dragged-along, and those that can be dragged-along cannot pre-empt their partners.
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transfers ex post, and when the venture is to be sold to a trade buyer or to be taken public in an
IPO.
We show that put and call options alleviate the problem of value-decreasing transfers from the
joint enterprise. Pre-emption rights and tag-along rights deny the parties the ability to impose
renegotiation by threatening the sale of their stake to a trade buyer who would decrease the value of
the venture, or to conspire with a trade buyer who would increase the value of the venture to exclude
their partners from sharing in that increase in value. Catch-up clauses deny the parties holding a
call option the ability to profit from exercising their call prior to a trade sale or an IPO. Drag-along
rights (respectively, demand rights) deny the parties the ability to impose renegotiation by vetoing
or refusing to take part in a value-increasing sale to a trade buyer (respectively, IPO).
Joint ventures and venture capital have received much attention in the academic literature.
Allen and Phillips (2000), Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995), Darrough and Stoughton (1989),
Gomes and Novaes (2001), McConnell and Nantell (1985), Mohanram and Nanda (1998), Pisano
(1989), Oxley (1997), and Rey and Tirole (1998) study various aspects of joint ventures, but not
the clauses analyzed in this paper. Nor do Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Aghion, Bolton and
Tirole (2000), Bergemann and Hege (1998), Berglo¨f (1994), Cornelli and Yosha (1997), Gompers
(1995), Kaplan and Stro¨mberg (1999), Repullo and Suarez (1998), Schmidt (1999), and Smith
(2001), who study venture capital contracts.3 Contracting in non-venture backed private companies
has received surprisingly little attention, despite the fact that such companies as a group typically
account for a larger share of economic activity than do stock market-listed firms (Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jørgensen, 2001; Fenn et al., 1995; Fenn and Liang, 1998). Previous work on privately-held
companies typically focuses on financing or valuation issues (Wruck, 1989; Berger and Udell, 1998;
Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Lerner, 2000; Lerner and Tsai, 2000). There appear to be no prior
contract-theoretic analyses of the clauses found in shareholder agreements.
3Call options that are embedded in convertible preferred stock constitute an exception. In this paper, we do not
attempt to address the optimality of financial clauses (see Aghion, Bolton and Tirole (2001) on the optimality of one
restricted type of contract in venture capital). Instead, we take the contracts as given and consider their effect on ex
ante investments and ex post transfers.
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We proceed as follows. We present the initial setting in Section 2. We analyze the case where
the venture must remain the property of one or both founding parties in Section 3. We analyze the
case in which the venture must be sold to a trade buyer or taken public in an IPO in Section 4. We
briefly discuss continuation and termination in alliances in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Appendix
1 contains a brief overview of the clauses found in standard shareholder agreements. Appendix 2
contains most proofs.
2 The initial setting
Two parties a and b jointly undertake a venture.
Each party must make an investment towards the success of the venture. Let ii denote the
investment made by party i, i ∈ {a, b}, at a cost ii.
Once undertaken, the venture can be put to four uses. It can remain a joint enterprise; be
acquired by one or the other founding party in its entirety; or be acquired in whole or in part by a
trade buyer.4 We denote u the use to which the venture is put, u ∈ {ab, a, b, tb}.
The value of the venture in use u is Vu (iaib, ti + tj , s). In addition to being affected by the
investments ia and ib, the value of the venture is also affected by the transfers ti and tj in which
the parties to the venture may engage.5 Any party to the venture, whether a founding party or
a trade buyer who has acquired the stake of a founding party, may engage in a transfer. Thus,
i, j ∈ {a, b, tb}. The personal benefit to party i of engaging in a transfer ti is Bi (ti) ≡ αiB (ti), with
αi > 0 an index of the relative importance of i’s personal benefit. We assume αa > αb.
Finally, the value of the venture depends on the state of the world s. We consider two states:
the state stb, in which a trade buyer who can increase the value of the venture offers to buy the
4The venture can also taken public in an IPO. As this outcome can be viewed as very similar to a trade sale (see
Section 4.2), we do not analyze it separately.
5The multiplicative formulation for investments is intended to capture their strong complementarity, whereas the
additive formulation for transfers reflects their substitutability. Note that it is only the investments made by the
founding parties that affect the value of the venture, even if the venture is later sold to a trade buyer.
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venture, and the state stb in which there is no such trade buyer. Thus:
Vtb (I, T, stb) > Vu (I, T, stb)
for u 6= tb, I ≡ iaib, and T ≡ ti + tj . We leave open the possibility that a trade buyer who cannot
increase the value of the venture exists in state stb. In either case, we assume that a trade buyer
has no bargaining power when bargaining with one or both founding parties.
We note that the investments ia and ib are made before the state s is realized, whereas the
transfers ti and tj , i, j ∈ {a, b, tb}, are made after the state is realized. Thus, transfers are made
from the venture’s payoff rather than the investments.
We make the following assumptions: Vu,1 > 0, Vu,11 < 0, Vu,2 < 0, Vu,22 < 0, Vu,12 < 0, B′ > 0,
B′′ = cst < 0. These assumptions imply that the value of the venture is increasing and concave in
investment, that it is decreasing and concave in transfers, that transfers decrease investment, and
that the personal benefits to transfers are increasing and concave in transfers. The assumption that
B′′ is constant simplifies the comparative statics analysis.
We also assume that Vu,2 (I, 0, s) + B′i (0) < 0. This implies that no transfer will take place
when the venture has a single owner. A party owning only part of the venture may, however, wish
to engage in a transfer. This is because the cost of the transfer is shared with the other party in
proportion to each party’s stake, whereas the benefit of the transfer is received in its entirety by the
party engaging in the transfer. We assume that transfers do occur when the venture has more than
a single owner.
Let γ, 0 < γ < 1, denote party a’s initial stake in the venture. We first show that — regardless
of the use u to which the venture is put, the transfers T that the parties will engage in, and the
realized state s — the value of γ that induces the founding parties a and b to make the investments
that maximize the value of the venture, subject to the constraint imposed by the problem of double
4
moral hazard, is γ = 12 .
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Proposition 1 The value of the venture Vu (iaib, T, s)− ia − ib is maximized at γ = 12 .
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 1 implies that the founding parties’ payoffs should always be in the proportions
γ = 12 = 1 − γ. This is a simple consequence of the symmetry of the parties. These proportions
should not be renegotiated, for renegotiation would distort the value of the investments made by
the founding parties. It would thereby decrease the value of the venture.
However, incentives to renegotiate will arise ex post. This is clearly the case where a trade buyer
appears who can increase the value of the venture, for a founding party may then seek to extract
more than his share of the increase in value by threatening to hold up the sale.
Even in the case where the venture should remain the joint property of the two founding parties,
the value of the venture can be increased ex post by changing the parties’ stakes from the values
(γ, 1− γ) to the values (γr, 1− γr) that minimize ex post transfers. To see this, recall that party a
derives a greater personal benefit from a transfer than does party b (αa > αb). Proposition 2 shows
that a’s stake γr should be reduced below 12 = γ.
Proposition 2 Following the making of the investments ia and ib and the realization of the state
stb, the stake that maximizes the value of the venture when it remains the joint property of the two
founding parties is γr < 12 = γ.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The inequality αa > αb implies that a transfer by party
a is less value-decreasing than a transfer by party b. The latter is therefore to be discouraged to a
greater extent than is the former. This is achieved by making b’s stake in the venture larger than
6We note that the first-best value of the venture is precluded by the problem of double moral hazard, for no party
can be the unique residual claimant to the investment he makes in such case (Holmstro¨m, 1982).
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a’s: 1− γr > 12 > γr.
We argue in what follows that the various clauses included in shareholder agreements are intended
to maintain the founding parties’ payoffs in the proportions γ and 1− γ prescribed by Proposition
1, despite the scope for renegotiation considered in Proposition 2 for example. We initially consider
the state stb where there is no trade buyer who can increase the value of the venture.
3 The state stb: put and call options, pre-emption rights, and
tag-along rights
3.1 Put and call options
Initially consider the case where the venture should remain the joint property of the two parties:
Vab
(
I, T r, stb
)
+ αaB (tra) + αbB (t
r
b) > max
[
Va
(
I, 0, stb
)
, Vb
(
I, 0, stb
)]
(1)
where T r = tra + t
r
b denotes the total transfer when the parties’ stakes are γ
r and 1− γr. Note that
no transfers take place when a single party owns the venture.
We show that a put option held by party a to put a stake γ − γr to party b at ‘fair’ value, or
a call option held by party b to call a stake γ − γr from party a at fair value, serve to change the
parties’ stakes from (γ, 1− γ) to (γr, 1− γr) while maintaining the parties’ payoffs in the desired
proportions γ and 1 − γ. We view the ‘fair’ value of the venture as the value of the venture under
the conditions that result from the exercise of the option. Shareholder agreements typically include
a clause outlining how the venture is to be valued. A popular option is to delegate valuation to
an external expert, such as a firm of accountants. Alternatively, the clause may set out a formula
for how value is to be determined. Here, we show in Proposition 3 that fair value is equal to
Vab
(
I, T r, stb
)
.
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Proposition 3 Options at fair value serve to minimize ex post transfers without distorting incen-
tives for ex ante investment.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Setting the strike price of the option equal to fair value denies both parties any direct benefit
from the exercise of the option. This maintains the parties’ payoffs in the proportions γ and 1− γ.
It therefore maintains the parties’ incentives for ex ante investments. Nonetheless, by changing the
parties’ stakes from (γ, 1− γ) to (γr, 1− γr) prior to the transfers, the exercise of the option makes
possible the minimization of ex post transfers.
We note that the choice between a put option granted party a and a call option granted party b
is not a matter of indifference, for the necessary and sufficient condition for party a to exercise the
put option implies that party b does not exercise the call option and, conversely, the necessary and
sufficient condition for party b to exercise the call option implies that party a does not exercise the
put option. For example, party a exercises the put option if and only if
γVab
(
I, T r, stb
)
+ αaB (tra)
> γVab
(
I, T, stb
)
+ αaB (ta)
+β
 Vab (I, T r, stb)+ αaB (tra) + αbB (trb)
− [Vab (I, T, stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tb)]
 (2)
where β denotes party a’s bargaining power. But inequality (2) implies that
(1− γ)Vab (I, T r, stb)+ αbB (trb)
< (1− γ)Vab (I, T, stb)+ αbB (tb)
+ (1− β)
 Vab (I, T r, stb)+ αaB (tra) + αbB (trb)
− [Vab (I, T, stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tb)]

Thus, a put option will be granted party a when inequality (2) is true, and a call option will be
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granted party b when it is false.7
Now consider the case where inequality (1) is reversed, calling for the venture to be acquired
by one or the other of the founding parties. Assume without loss of generality that Va
(
I, 0, stb
)
<
Vb
(
I, 0, stb
)
. In this case too, we can show that a put option granted party a or a call option granted
party b will maintain investment incentives. Either option is for party a’s entire stake and is at fair
value, which implies a strike price γVb
(
I, 0, stb
)
.
Proposition 4 In the case where the minimization of ex post transfers requires the entire venture
is to be acquired by a single party following the realization of the state, an option at fair value serves
to maintain the parties’ incentives for ex ante investments.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3.
In this case too, the choice between a put option and a call option is not a matter of indifference.
Party a will be granted a put option when the inequality
γVa
(
I, 0, stb
)
> γVab
(
I, T, stb
)
+ αaB (ta)
+β
[
Va
(
I, 0, stb
)− [Vab (I, T, stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tb)]]
is true, and party b will be granted a call option when it is false.
3.2 Pre-emption rights and tag-along rights
When a founding party wishes to sell his stake in the venture, pre-emption rights grant the remaining
party the right to buy the departing party’s stake at fair value. This is so even where the departing
7A sufficient condition for inequality (2) to hold is that β < γ. The low bargaining power of party a ensures that
a wishes to avoid bargaining. This is done by exercising the put option. To establish the sufficiency of the condition
β < γ, assume inequality (2) is false. This implies:
(γ − β)Vab  I, T r, stb+ (1− β)αaB (tra)− βαbB (trb)
< (γ − β)Vab  I, T, stb+ (1− β)αaB (ta)− βαbB (tb)
But the inequality is false as the results T r < T , tra > ta, and t
r
b < tb from the proof of Proposition 2 combine
with the assumptions V2 < 0 and B′ > 0 to imply that each term on the LHS of the inequality is larger than the
corresponding term on the RHS.
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party has been offered a higher price for his stake by an outside party.8
To motivate the use of pre-emption rights, assume there exists a trade buyer tb who cannot
increase the value of the venture but can extract more value from the venture than can party a for
example. Specifically, assume9
Vtb
(
I, ttb + ttbb , stb
)
+ αtbB (ttb) + αbB
(
ttbb
)
< Vtb
(
I, 0, stb
)
< Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) + αbB
(
tabb
)
(3)
but
γVtb
(
I, ttb + ttbb , stb
)
+ αtbB (ttb)
> γVab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) (4)
where ttbb ≡ argmaxbtb (1− γ)Vtb
(
I, ttb + t̂b, stb
)
+ αbB
(
t̂b
)
and tabb is defined similarly. Note that
ta > tabb as γ =
1
2 , αa > αb, and B
′′ < 0.
Inequalities (3) and (4) imply that
(1− γ)Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αbB (ttbb )
< (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αbB (tabb ) (5)
The preceding inequalities imply that both founding parties will wish to renegotiate the distri-
bution of payoffs rather than have party a sell his stake to the trade buyer. Such renegotiation is ex
post efficient, but ex ante inefficient as its distorts the parties’ incentives to invest. We show that
pre-emption rights serve to avoid renegotiation, by denying party a the incentive to threaten selling
8Pre-emption rights therefore differ from the right of refusal (see Appendix 1).
9In order to simplify the exposition, we neglect the option that one party will have on the stake γ − γr. This can
be shown not to affect our main results.
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his stake to the trade buyer in the state stb under the sufficient condition that
γVb
(
I, 0, stb
)
+β
[
Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) + αbB
(
tabb
)− Vb (I, 0, stb)]
< γVab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) (6)
Inequality (6) ensures that party a’s payoff, were b to threaten to exercise his pre-emption right
in response to a’s threat to sell his stake to the trade buyer and the founding parties were to
renegotiate, is lower than party a’s payoff from refraining from doing so. Party a therefore refrains
from threatening to sell his stake.
Proposition 5 Pre-emption rights serve to deter a party from threatening to sell his stake to a
trade buyer who would transfer more value from the venture but would not increase its value.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Tag-along rights, which allow party b to require the trade buyer to buy b’s stake on the same
terms and conditions as party a’s stake, may serve the same role as pre-emption rights. Tag-along
rights deny the trade buyer the incentive to engage in transfers, as such rights make the trade buyer’s
acquisition of the venture conditional on him being the single owner of the venture. They therefore
decrease the price he can offer for party a’s stake and thereby diminish the credibility of party a’s
threat to sell his stake to the trade buyer.
Proposition 6 Tag-along rights may serve to deter a party from threatening to sell his stake to a
trade buyer who would transfer more value from the venture but would not increase its value.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
10
4 The state stb: catch-up clauses, drag-along rights, demand
rights, tag-along rights, and pre-emption rights
We now consider the state stb, in which a trade buyer appears who can increase the value of the
venture.
4.1 Catch-up clauses
We first consider catch-up clauses. Recall that party b has a call option on part of party a’s stake
when inequality (1) is true. Thus, in state stb, party b will want to exercise the call prior to the
sale of the venture to the trade buyer if he expects the valuation of the strike price not yet to
reflect the increase in the value of the venture that will be made possible by the trade sale (perhaps
because neither the external valuation expert nor party a are yet aware of the impending trade sale).
Exercising the option allows party b to profit from that increase in the proportion 1− γr > 1− γ.
To avoid this outcome, which would distort ex ante investment, catch-up clauses grant party a
the right to any additional gain made by party b when exercising the call option on part of party a’s
stake shortly before selling the venture. This maintains the parties’ payoffs in the desired proportions
γ and 1− γ.
4.2 Drag-along rights and demand rights
As is clear from the definition of state stb, both founding parties will gain from the sale of the venture
to the trade buyer. Despite such gains, one of the two parties can profit by vetoing the sale of the
venture. This is because such veto will lead to bargaining between the parties, as the other party
tries to buy the vetoing party’s assent to the value-increasing sale.
To see that at least one party will wish to veto the sale of the venture, consider the conditions
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necessary for neither party to wish to do so:
γVtb (I, 0, stb)
> γVab (I, T, stb) + αaB (ta)
+β [Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [Vab (I, T, stb) + αaB (ta) + αbB (tb)]] (7)
and
(1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb)
> (1− γ)Vab (I, T, stb) + αbB (tb)
+ (1− β) [Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [Vab (I, T, stb) + αaB (ta) + αbB (tb)]] (8)
The inequalities cannot simultaneously be true, as the sum of their LHS equals that of their
RHS. Thus, one party will wish to veto the sale if granted the right to do so.
However, denying both parties the right to veto the sale will not necessarily solve the problem
that arises from the unwillingness of one or both founding parties to sell to the trade buyer at the
outset. Consider the case where neither holds a veto. Despite this, we can show that one party will
hold up the sale, in the expectation of extracting more from the trade buyer by bargaining when the
value of the venture is maximized under the trade buyer’s sole ownership. For example, in the case
where αa > 0 = αb = αtb, party a but not party b will profit from refraining from taking part in the
trade sale, for a’s ability to engage in transfers implies that he will be bought out at a premium by
12
the trade buyer. Formally, we have
γVtb (I, ta, stb) + αaB (ta)
+ [Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [Vtb (I, ta, stb) + αaB (ta)]]
= Vtb (I, 0, stb)− (1− γ)Vtb (I, ta, stb)
> Vtb (I, 0, stb)− (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb) (9)
= γVtb (I, 0, stb)
for party a, and
(1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb)
+ [Vtb (I, 0, stb)− Vtb (I, 0, stb)]
= (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb)
for party b. In such a case, however, party b will not be offered (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb) by the trade
buyer, as the latter’s expectation of bargaining with party a implies that the most the trade buyer
can offer party b is
Vtb (I, 0, stb)−
 γVtb (I, ta, stb) + αaB (ta)
+ [Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [Vtb (I, ta, stb) + αaB (ta)]]

< Vtb (I, 0, stb)− γVtb (I, 0, stb)
= (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb)
where the inequality is true by the inequality in expression (9). Party b too will therefore refuse to
sell to the trade buyer, and bargaining will occur despite the denial of veto rights to both founding
parties. We show in Proposition 7 that drag-along rights, which allow a party selling to a trade
buyer to force the other party to join the first party in the trade sale, serve to avoid bargaining.
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Proposition 7 Drag-along rights serve to avoid bargaining between the founding parties when the
venture is to be sold to a trade buyer.
Proof: It suffices to show that one party will wish to exercise his drag-along rights. But this is
immediate from the fact that the two inequalities (7) and (8) cannot simultaneously be false. The
party for whom the inequality is true will exercise his drag-along rights.
We now turn to demand rights. These allow a party to force the other party to agree to taking
the joint venture public in an IPO. We argue that demand rights are very similar to drag-along
rights, in that they are intended to avoid bargaining prior to an IPO.10 As with drag-along rights,
demand rights deny the parties veto rights. In contrast to drag-along rights, they do not mandate
that the parties sell their entire stakes in the IPO. We view this difference as due to the lower ability
of parties that hold large stakes in a publicly-quoted company to transfer value from the company,
because of the constraints imposed by stock exchanges, regulation, and the law.11
4.3 Tag-along rights and pre-emption rights
Tag-along rights are in some ways the mirror image of drag-along rights. The latter grant the party
arranging a trade sale the right to force the other party to take part in the trade sale. The former
grant the party left out of a trade sale arranged by the other party the right to force the trade buyer
to buy its stake.
Section 3.2 has shown that there is a role for tag-along rights when one party threatens to sell
his stake to a trade buyer who would not increase the value of the venture but would increase the
value of the selling party’s stake through larger transfers from the venture. In this section, we show
that there is a role for tag-along rights when one party tries to conspire with a trade buyer who can
10This can be formalized by introducing a use u = ipo and a state sipo which are such that:
Vipo (I, T, sipo) > Vu (I, T, sipo)
for u 6= ipo.
11For example, stock exchanges require companies to abide by ‘Continuing Obligations’ that are aimed at protecting
outside shareholders.
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increase the value of the venture to exclude the other party from the increase in value. Specifically,
assume that
Vtb (I, 0, stb)
> Vtb
(
I, ttb + ttbb , stb
)
+ αtbB (ttb) + αbB
(
ttbb
)
> Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) + αbB
(
tabb
)
and
γVtb
(
I, ttb + ttbb , stb
)
+ αtbB (ttb)
> γVtb (I, 0, stb)
> γVab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta)
but
(1− γ)Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αbB (ttbb )
< (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb)
< (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αbB (tabb )
Under these circumstances, it is clear that party a would like to conspire with the trade buyer
to have the trade buyer buy party a’s stake at the following price:
γVtb
(
I, ttb + ttbb , stb
)
+ αtbB (ttb) > γVtb (I, 0, stb)
Party a’s gain is at the expense of party b, whose payoff after negotiating with the trade buyer
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for the latter to buy the former’s stake is
(1− γ)Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αbB (ttbb )
+
[
Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αtbB (ttb) + αbB (ttbb )]]
= Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [γVtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αtbB (ttb)]
< Vtb (I, 0, stb)− [γVtb (I, 0, stb)] (10)
= (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb)
The founding parties’ payoffs are thereby altered from the desired proportions γ and 1− γ. We
show in Proposition 8 that tag-along rights granted party b serve to maintain the parties’ payoffs in
these proportions.
Proposition 8 Tag-along rights preclude a founding party from conspiring with a trade buyer to
exclude the other founding party from sharing in the increase in value made possible by the sale of
the venture to the trade buyer in the desired proportions γ and 1− γ.
Proof: It suffices to show that party b will exercise his tag-along rights, for the obligation for the
trade buyer to buy the parties’ stakes on the same terms and conditions in that case implies that the
parties will receive the desired γVtb (I, 0, stb) and (1− γ)Vtb (I, 0, stb). But that party b will exercise
his drag-along rights is immediate from inequality (10).
We have seen in Section 3.2 that pre-emption rights and drag-along rights are to some extent
substitutes in the case where one party threatens to sell the venture to a trade buyer who would
extract more value from the venture but would not increase its value. These rights are also substitutes
in the present case. In particular, if
γVb (I, 0, stb) + β [Vtb (I, 0, stb)− Vb (I, 0, stb)] < γVtb (I, 0, stb)
then party b’s pre-emption rights can be shown to preclude party a from conspiring with the trade
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buyer. If the reverse inequality holds, then pre-emption rights fail to do so.
5 Continuation and termination in alliances
We briefly consider the issue of whether to continue or terminate an alliance.12 An alliance is a form
of joint undertaking that often has a pre-specified finite life, after which it is terminated unless the
party with the option to extend its life for an additional period chooses to do so. We argue in this
section that the purpose of this option is to avoid renegotiation.
We modify the model of the preceding sections as follows. We denote the value of the alliance
Vc (iaib, s) when continued and Vt (iaib, s) when terminated. We neglect ex post transfers for sim-
plicity but without loss of generality. Let sc denote the state of the world in which the alliance
should be continued and st denote that in which it should be terminated. Thus,
Vc (iaib, sc) > Vt (iaib, sc)
and
Vc (iaib, st) < Vt (iaib, st)
As in Section 2, we can show that equal stakes maximize the value of the alliance, subject to
the constraints imposed by the problem of double moral hazard: γ = 12 = 1 − γ. To motivate the
use of the option to extend the life of the alliance, consider state sc in which the alliance should be
continued and each party has payoff γVc (iaib, sc). Can a party, say party a, profit from threatening
not to agree to the continuation of the alliance for the purpose of bargaining with party b? Party
12We thank Josh Lerner for encouraging us to do so.
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a’s payoff from doing so is
γVt (iaib, sc) + β [Vc (iaib, sc)− Vt (iaib, sc)]
= βVc (iaib, sc)− (β − γ)Vt (iaib, sc)
> γVc (iaib, sc)
for β > γ. This problem cannot be solved by specifying that the life of the alliance be infinite, for
party a would then threaten not to agree to the termination of the alliance in state st. The problem,
of course, is that a change in the status of the alliance that requires party a’s agreement provides a
with an opportunity to exploit his greater bargaining power.
The problem can be solved by granting party b the option to extend the life of the alliance, for
such an option dispenses party b from seeking party a’s approval. The option will not be exploited
by party b, for his lower bargaining power implies that he has nothing to gain from bargaining.
Indeed, consider an attempt by party b to threaten continuing the alliance in state st. His payoff
from doing so is
(1− γ)Vc (iaib, st) + (1− β) [Vt (iaib, st)− Vc (iaib, st)]
= (1− β)Vt (iaib, st) + (β − γ)Vc (iaib, st)
< (1− γ)Vt (iaib, st)
as Vc (iaib, st) < Vt (iaib, st). Party b will therefore not exploit his option.
6 Conclusion
We have presented an explanation for a number of key clauses that often appear in shareholder
agreements, such as those between partners in a joint venture and between a venture capitalist and
an entrepreneur. In the presence of a problem of dynamic, double moral hazard, the clauses preserve
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the parties’ incentives to make ex ante investments and they minimize ex post transfers.
Much of the analysis has revolved around the idea that clauses are used to avoid renegotiation.
Yet, renegotiation often occurs in practice (Lerner and Tsai, 2000). We ascribe such renegotiation
to three factors. Renegotiation is likely to arise in the presence of financing constraints, in the
presence of asymmetric information, and when the conditions that must hold for pre-emption rights
and tag-along rights to be effective are not true.
Consider financing constraints first. Recall that our model requires the parties to own equal
shares of the joint undertaking. But wealth constraints on one or the other party may mean that
one party owns a larger share of the venture at the outset. In such case, should the wealth constraint
be relaxed at some point in the future, perhaps as a result of a change in the availability of external
finance, one would expect the parties to renegotiate their shares.13
Now consider asymmetric information. Our model has assumed that, on realization of the state,
there was no asymmetry of information among the parties. Yet, at least in the case where one party
is to buy out the other, it is likely that each party has better knowledge of the value of the venture
to itself than does the other party. Under such circumstances, the party that has been granted the
put option may mistakenly believe that the value of the venture is higher for the other party than
it is for itself, and exercise his put option when he should not. Renegotiation would occur in such
case.
Finally, consider the conditions that must hold for pre-emption rights and tag-along rights to be
effective. Should these condition not be satisfied, it is likely that the corresponding clauses will fail
in their intended purpose of avoiding renegotiation. They may not even be included in the contract.
We acknowledge the importance of the preceding considerations and their potential to explain
contract clauses that we have not explained, such as the right of first refusal. We leave these
considerations for future research.
13Lerner and Tsai (2000) document such patterns in biotechnology alliances.
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Appendix 1: An overview of shareholder agreements
Standard shareholder agreements typically contain the following articles or groups of articles
(Bernstein, 1988; Freedman, 1994; Martel, 1991; Stedman and Jones, 1990):
• Termination of prior agreements between some or all shareholders regarding the organization
and affairs of the company, as well as warranties and covenants specifying that all shares are
free and clear of all claims.
• Provision of control: Designation of the rights and duties of the shareholders in the manage-
ment of the company, and requirement of prior unanimous consent for major decisions such as
the declaration of any dividend and the issuance or sale of shares.
• Restrictions on the transfer of shares: The shareholders commit not to sell, pledge, or charge
their shares except with the prior written consent of all other shareholders.
• Survivorship arrangements: Upon the death of any shareholder, the personal representatives of
the deceased shall sell the shares of the deceased to the company, typically at a price specified in
the article on valuation. Life insurance policies will be issued to the benefit of the shareholders
to ensure that this article can be enforced.
• Valuation: The ‘fair’ value of the shares is generally determined by an external expert, or it is
based on a previously agreed upon valuation formula.
• Right of first refusal: A shareholder offered to sell his shares to an outside investor at some
price is required to offer his shares to the other shareholders at the same price. If the other
shareholders decline, the first shareholder is free to sell his shares to the outside investor.
• Pre-emption rights: A shareholder wishing to sell his stake in the company is required to
offer his shares to the other shareholders. Pre-emption rights can take several forms. In the
extreme, selling the shares to an outside investor is actually prohibited.
• Put options: A shareholder is granted put options on the shares held by the other shareholders.
The strike price is generally the ‘fair’ value of the shares.
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• Call options: Similar to put options.
• Catch up clauses: When a shareholder exercises a call option, the selling shareholder maintains
a claim on part of the payoff subsequently realized by the first shareholder in a trade sale or
an IPO.
• Drag-along rights: In case a shareholder sells his stake to an outside investor, drag-along rights
grant the investor the right to buy out the other shareholders’ stakes at the same price and on
the same terms as the first shareholder’s stake. Drag-along rights can be viewed as conditional
call options granted the outside investor.
• Tag-along rights (or piggy-back rights, or co-sale agreements): In case a shareholder sells his
stake to an outside investor, tag-along rights grant the other shareholders the right to require
the outside investor to buy these shareholders’ stakes at the same price and on the same terms
as the first shareholder’s stake. Tag-along rights can be viewed as conditional put options
granted all shareholders.
• Demand rights (or initial public offering clauses): Shareholders agree in advance the circum-
stances in which they will take the company public. Demand rights ensure that the company
will be taken public once a prespecified level of profit is achieved, or when the company has a
specific need for outside finance. Demand rights may require all shareholders to participate in
the offering.
• Non-competition: Each and every shareholder undertakes not to compete with the venture.
• Dispute resolution and arbitration: The shareholders agree to follow a specified procedure to
resolve disputes. The procedure may specify the appointment of an arbitrator.
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Appendix 2: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: γ is the solution to the problem
Max
γ
Vu (iaib, T, s)− ia − ib
where
ia = argmaxbia γVu
(̂
iaib, T, s
)
− îa
and
ib = argmaxbib (1− γ)Vu
(
iaîb, T, s
)
− îb
The corresponding first-order conditions are
Vu,1 (iaib, T, s)
[
ib
∂ia
∂γ
+ ia
∂ib
∂γ
]
− ∂ia
∂γ
− ∂ib
∂γ
= 0 (11)
ibγVu,1 (iaib, T, s)− 1 = 0 (12)
and
ia (1− γ)Vu,1 (iaib, T, s)− 1 = 0 (13)
Equations (12) and (13) imply
γib = (1− γ) ia (14)
Using equations (12), (13), and (14), we can rewrite equation (11) as
(1− γ)2 ∂ia
∂γ
+ γ2
∂ib
∂γ
= 0 (15)
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Totally differentiating equation (14) with respect to γ, we obtain
(1− γ) ∂ia
∂γ
= γ
∂ib
∂γ
+ ia + ib (16)
Substituting equation (16) into equation (15), we have
∂ib
∂γ
= − ib
γ
(17)
Substituting equation (17) into equation (16), we obtain
∂ia
∂γ
=
ia
1− γ (18)
We conjecture a solution γ = 12 and denote the corresponding value of the venture
V = Vu
(
i2, T, s
)− 2i
where we have used equation (14) to write ia = ib ≡ i.
To show that γ = 12 is a maximum, we compute the value of the venture corresponding to
γδ =
1
2 + δ. Let ia,δ and ib,δ denote the corresponding investments made by the parties. From
equations (18) and (17) we have
ia,δ = ia + δ
∂ia
∂γ
= ia [1 + 2δ] = i [1 + 2δ]
ib,δ = ib + δ
∂ib
∂γ
= ib [1− 2δ] = i [1− 2δ]
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The corresponding value of the venture equals
Vδ = Vu (ia,δib,δ, T, s)− ia,δ − ib,δ
= Vu
(
i2 [1 + 2δ] [1− 2δ] , T, s)− 2i
= Vu
(
i2
[
1− 4δ2] , T, s)− 2i
< V
where the inequality is true by the assumption that Vu,1 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: The stake γr is the solution to the problem
Max
γr
Vab
(
I, tra + t
r
b , stb
)
+ αaB (tra) + αbB (t
r
b)
where
tra = argmaxbta γrVab
(
I, t̂a + trb , stb
)
+ αaB
(
t̂a
)
and
trb = argmaxbtb (1− γr)Vab
(
I, tra + t̂b, stb
)
+ αbB
(
t̂b
)
The corresponding first-order conditions are
V2
(
I, tra + t
r
b , stb
) [ ∂tra
∂γr
+
∂trb
∂γr
]
+ αaB′ (tra)
∂tra
∂γr
+ αbB′ (trb)
∂trb
∂γr
= 0 (19)
γrV2
(
I, tra + t
r
b , stb
)
+ αaB′ (tra) = 0 (20)
and
(1− γr)V2 (I, tra + trb , stb)+ αbB′ (trb) = 0 (21)
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From equations (20) and (21), we obtain
∂tra
∂γr
= − V2 [V22 + αbB
′′]
γrV22αbB′′ + αaB′′ [(1− γr)V22 + αbB′′] < 0
and
∂trb
∂γr
=
V2 [V22 + αaB′′]
γrV22αbB′′ + αaB′′ [(1− γr)V22 + αbB′′] > 0
which implies that
∣∣∣ ∂trb∂γr ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣ ∂tra∂γr ∣∣∣ as αa > αb. Substituting equations (20) and (21) into equation
(19), we have
(1− γr) ∂t
r
a
∂γr
+ γr
∂trb
∂γr
= 0
⇔ γ
r
1− γr =
− ∂tra∂γr
∂trb
∂γr
< 1
⇒ γr < 1
2
= γ
The preceding implies that as the parties’ stakes change from (γ, 1− γ) to (γr, 1− γr), ta in-
creases to tra, tb decreases to t
r
b , and T = ta + tb decreases to T
r ≡ tra + trb .
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider the case where party a has been granted a put option at
fair value on the stake γ − γr.14 Let F denote the fair value of the venture under the conditions
that result from the exercise of the option. Following the realization of the state, the parties choose
ex post transfers so as to
Maxbta γVab
(
I, t̂a + tb, stb
)
+
[− (γ − γr)Vab (I, t̂a + tb, stb)+ (γ − γr)F ]+ αaB (t̂a)
= Maxbta γrVab
(
I, t̂a + tb, stb
)
+ (γ − γr)F + αaB (t̂a)
and
Maxbtb (1− γr)Vab
(
I, ta + t̂b, stb
)− (γ − γr)F + αbB (t̂b)
14The case where party b has been granted a call option is similar.
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Clearly, parties a and b will engage in the transfers tra and t
r
b , as desired. The fair value F
of the venture under the conditions that result from the exercise of the option therefore equals
Vab
(
I, T r, stb
)
. The strike price equals (γ − γr)Vab (I, T r, stb), thereby ensuring that party a does
indeed exercise the put option.
The preceding implies that, when making the ex ante investments, the parties’ payoffs conditional
on the state stb being realized are
γrVab
(
I, T r, stb
)
+ (γ − γr)F + αaB (tra)
= γrVab
(
I, T r, stb
)
+ (γ − γr)Vab (I, T r, stb)+ αaB (tra)
= γVab
(
I, T r, stb
)
+ αaB (tra)
for party a and (1− γ)Vab (I, T r, stb)+ αbB (trb) for party b. The parties’ payoffs have been main-
tained in the desired proportions γ and 1− γ.
Proof of Proposition 5: Inequality (6) ensures that party a will not attempt to sell his stake
to the trade buyer if he expects party b to threaten to exercise his pre-emption rights. It remains to
show that party b will indeed threaten to exercise these rights. His payoff if he does is
(1− γ)Vb (I, 0, stb)
+(1− β) [Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tabb )− Vb (I, 0, stb)]
> (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αbB (tabb )
where the inequality is true from inequality (6). His payoff if he does not and renegotiates with
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party a is
(1− γ)Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αbB (ttbb )
+(1− β)
 Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tabb )
− [Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αtbB (ttb) + αbB (ttbb )]

< (1− γ)Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αbB (ttbb )
+
 Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tabb )
− [Vtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αtbB (ttb) + αbB (ttbb )]

= Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) + αbB
(
tabb
)
− [γVtb (I, ttb + ttbb , stb)+ αtbB (ttb)]
< Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) + αbB
(
tabb
)
− [γVab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αaB (ta)]
= (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αbB (tabb )
where the second inequality is true by inequality (4).
Proof of Proposition 6: Let P denote the price that the trade buyer would pay for the venture.
This price must be such that
γP > γVab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) (22)
and
P 6 Vtb
(
I, 0, stb
)
(23)
Both inequalities are necessary for party a’s threat to sell his stake to the trade buyer tb to be
credible. Party a would not wish to sell his stake if inequality (22) were false, and the trade buyer
tb would not wish to buy the venture if inequality (23) were false.
27
Combined with inequality (3), inequalities (22) and (23) imply the necessary condition
Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+
αa
γ
B (ta)
< Vab
(
I, ta + tabb , stb
)
+ αaB (ta) + αbB
(
tabb
)
But this condition is false as αaγ = 2αa > αa + αb and B (ta) > B
(
tabb
)
as ta > tabb .
15 It is
therefore impossible for P to satisfy inequalities (22) and (23) simultaneously.
Note that tag-along rights do not always succeed in deterring the sale to the trade buyer. For
example, if
Vtb
(
I, 0, stb
) ' Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αaB (ta) + αbB (tabb )
then party a’s tag-along rights can be shown to fail in deterring party b from threatening to sell his
stake to the trade buyer tb. To see this, let P = Vtb
(
I, 0, stb
)
and note that
(1− γ)P ' (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ (1− γ)αaB (ta) + (1− γ)αbB (tabb )
> (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ (1− γ)αbB (tabb )+ (1− γ)αbB (tabb )
= (1− γ)Vab (I, ta + tabb , stb)+ αbB (tabb )
where the inequality is true as αa > αb and B (ta) > B
(
tabb
)
as ta > tabb and the second equality is
true as γ = 12 .
15Note that the exercise of the option on the stake γ − γr does not invalidate this conclusion, as γr < γ, tra > ta,
and tab,rb < t
ab
b from the proof of Proposition 2.
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